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 Executive Summary 
The Childcare Affordability Pilots 2009 (CAP09) were set up to assess the 
impact of providing alternative forms of childcare support to families moving 
into work.  A number of pilots were set up across government departments 
and local authorities and this paper examines one of the three that were run 
by HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC). 
 
The Actual Costs pilot1 was set up to assess family’s reactions and 
behaviours in using a payment system better designed to help them budget 
for their childcare costs, given that they often vary significantly across the 
year.  The current system run by HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) pays 
childcare support as an element of the Working Tax Credits system, and 
relies on families to correctly average their costs for the full year.  HMRC 
statistics2 show that on average 8.9% of tax credit claims in 2008/09 had 
elements of error or fraud favouring the claimant, with this error and fraud 
element valued at some £2.11bn to the Exchequer.  For childcare cases the 
error and fraud rate valued some £390m out of expenditure totalling almost 
£1.6bn in 2008/09, or nearly 25% of expenditure on childcare. 
 
Overall results showed that a system of paying a proportion of actual 
childcare costs in arrears would significantly reduce the level of error and 
fraud in the system, with a subsequent reduction in over-payments.  Initial 
problems in explaining the system to families, and in getting them to call in 
their costs on time every 4 weeks, meant that the underlying operational costs 
were high.  In terms of cost / benefit it is debateable whether a telephone 
based system run on the same basis as the Actual Costs pilot would be cost 
effective.  Utilising more automatic on-line reporting of costs would be less 
expensive, but would inevitably lose some of the reduction in error and fraud 
benefits found in the pilot. 
 
The data analysis has limited information as to why families chose not to 
participate in the CAP09 Actual Costs pilot.  HMRC telephone records for 
about 800 families clearly show ‘do not want monthly contact’ as a primary 
reason.  For a broader understanding of the issues around the Actual Costs 
pilot please read this report in conjunction with the CAP09 research report3. 
 
In terms of budgeting requirements families appear to have coped well with 
fewer over-payments resulting from the process.  A transition payment to help 
families move into childcare or the change from up-front average to actual 
cost arrears payments was taken up by 50% of families and seems to have 
been received very well.  The CAP09 research discusses how well and also 
                                                 
1 Under the Tax Credit system for the payment of the Childcare Cost Element, families are asked to 
average their costs over the year.  The Actual Costs Pilot was designed to help families budget better 
by paying a proportion (80%) of the last month’s actual costs. 
2 Child & Working Tax Credits, Error and Fraud Statistics 2008/09 
3 CAP09 research report: Qualitative Research into Families’ Experiences and Behaviours in the 
Childcare Affordability Pilots (CAP09): Actual Costs Pilot 
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why the other 50% of families may not have wanted the payment.  However 
the facility to take advance payments where costs varied by more than £100 
per month was taken by only 9 families, 7 of whom ended up with over 
payments. 
 
Three separate groups were targeted, those out of work and childcare, those 
in work but not receiving support for childcare and those in work and 
benefiting from the children’s element of childcare, so that a broad 
understanding of behaviours could be tracked for families either new to, or 
already established in, work and childcare. 
 
Introduction 
 
The primary aims of the Actual Costs pilot focuses not on take-up as with the 
100% and the Disabled Children pilots, but more on the experiences and 
behaviour of families under the piloted system of reporting and payment.  The 
Actual Costs pilot looks at whether an alternative process, whereby families 
do not have to average, and can claim (a proportion) of their actual last 
month’s childcare costs, helps families to budget better, and results in a lower 
level of error and fraud overall. 
 
There is no enhancement of benefits in this pilot, rather families are offered 
the opportunity to budget for their costs better with more frequent contact (4 
weekly rather than once a year ‘averaging’).  The aims of this report are to 
assess whether the CAP09 Actual Costs pilot resulted in: 
 
• A reported improvement in families’ ability to know which costs to 
report to HMRC, and to do so more accurately. 
• A reported improvement in families’ ability to pay their childcare costs, 
especially when these fluctuate throughout the year 
• A decrease in over/underpayments among families in the pilot, as 
compared to the control group. 
• A decrease in error rates among families in the pilot, as compared to 
the control group. 
• Families are able and willing to report their costs at the end of each 
month.  
 
The Actual Costs pilot was run in two cohorts i.e. those joining the pilot in 
2009-10 and those joining in 2010-11. The pilot was offered to three 
categories of family and all were targeted families with children who lived in 
London and the South East of England. 
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Background 
There are some 6.3 million families4 who receive tax credit and childcare 
payments in the UK.  Of these 5.7 million families have children and receive 
Child Tax Credits or the equivalent and 0.6 million families are in-work but 
without children receiving Working Tax Credit payments only. 
 
Of the 5.7 million families with children, 486,000 benefit from the childcare 
element. Each receives an average of £69.50 per week help with their 
childcare costs.  Total annual childcare costs amount to nearly £1.6 billion. 
 
To understand variations in this report around the cost of childcare reported it 
is important to note that the Actual Costs pilot covers families in London and 
the South East only 
 
Figure 1: Regional variations in average childcare support payments, provisional awards, 
December 2010 
England 244.4 157.4 401.8 £69.33 119.2
 North East 13.1 8.1 21.2 £66.85 7.3
 North West 44.8 29.3 74.1 £66.90 17.4
 Yorks & The Humber 26.4 19.1 45.5 £64.71 12.8
 East Midlands 21.3 16.8 38.2 £65.39 11.4
 West Midlands 27.9 19.9 47.8 £66.30 14.7
 East 20.1 13.3 33.4 £68.24 13.2
 London 41.7 12.0 53.6 £95.51 12.3
 South East 29.5 20.5 50.1 £65.51 17.9
 South West 19.6 18.4 37.9 £57.79 12.1
Wales 13.0 9.7 22.7 £65.07 8.1
Scotland 29.4 14.8 44.2 £68.43 11.8
Northern Ireland 9.9 6.3 16.2 £82.29 6.1
Foreign and not known 0.4 0.4 0.8 £82.85 0.2
United Kingdom 297.2 188.6 485.7 £69.50 145.5
Benefiting from childcare element (£'000s)
Benefiting 
from 
disabled 
child 
element
Singles Couples Total
Average 
help with 
childcare 
costs (£ per 
week)
 
                                                 
4 Data from National Statistics “Child and Working Tax Credits Statistics”, December 2010 
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Figure 1 clearly shows that the average level of childcare benefit paid last 
year in London was about 40% higher than elsewhere in the United Kingdom, 
whilst levels in the South East are about at the average level.  The average 
childcare costs reported in the CAP09 pilot will therefore be higher than would 
be seen if the pilot were rolled out nationally.   
 
Furthermore there is a significantly higher ratio of single parent families to 
couples in London than elsewhere in the United Kingdom.  This report will 
show clearly that single parent families are more likely overall to consider 
work and formal childcare than couples. 
 
Families with children who work 16 or more hours per week5 are entitled to 
childcare support as part of Working Tax Credit6. The proportion of eligible 
childcare costs covered by the childcare element was 70% when Working Tax 
Credit was first introduced in April 2003. It was then increased to 80% from 
April 2006 onwards.  The government have now announced in the 2010 
Spending Review that the proportion of childcare costs covered by tax credits 
will return back to 70% in April 2011.  
 
The maximum limits of childcare costs in the current system that can be 
claimed are: 
 
• Up to £175 per week for one child 
• Up to £300 per week for two or more children 
 
In the standard tax credits system families are asked to calculate their 
average weekly costs over the course of a year, and then receive equal 
payments in each period. An HMRC study7 suggests that families find it 
difficult to perform the averaging calculation, and this causes high levels of 
error due to misreporting of childcare costs, which in turn can lead to incorrect 
payments and budgeting difficulties.  Data analysis shows there are distinct 
seasonal variations in cost (please see figure 6 below) thus increasing the 
complexity in calculating averages.  Mathematical issues and a need to be 
able to forecast likely variations in childcare cover only exacerbate the level of 
error in tax credit claims for the childcare element.   
                                                 
5 Families who work, but for less than 16 hours a week, receive childcare benefits via the New Deal run 
by Jobcentre Plus. 
6 In most couples both parents need to work 16 or more hours to be eligible. 
7Cognitive Testing to Investigate Customer’s Understanding of Processes Relating to the Childcare 
Element of Working Tax Credit (WTC): HM Revenue and Customs Research Report 85.  This 
reported: “Both awareness and understanding of the calculation required by HMRC, in order to provide 
the ‘average weekly cost of childcare’, was extremely low. Participants did not know that, in order to 
provide an accurate estimate, they needed to make a calculation, and when this calculation was 
explained, many lacked confidence in making it themselves”.  
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Families targeted by the Actual Costs pilot 
This section looks at the methodologies on how the target families for this pilot 
were selected. 
 
Cohort 1: 2009 -10 – this was split into two groups: 
o Cohort 1a: Out-of-work8 lone parents and couples where at least one 
partner is out-of-work 
o Cohort 1b: In-work lone parents and couples where both partners are 
in-work, but not already claiming the childcare element 
 
Both groups of families also need to match the following characteristics: 
o Have children (age under 15 or disabled children age under 16); 
o Out of work families including single earner couples (working hours 
between 0 and 15 per week) and in-work families but not claiming the 
childcare element of tax credits; 
o Household income up to £16,000 in 2008-09; 
 
Cohort 2: 2010 -11 
o In-work lone parents and couples already claiming the childcare 
element. 
 
These families match the following characteristics: 
o Have children (age under 15 or disabled children age under 16); 
o In-work families who are currently receiving childcare support through 
Working Tax Credits; 
o Household income up to £21,000 for lone parents and up to £23,000 
for dual earner couples in 2009-10. 
 
Two cohorts have been necessary to generate sufficient numbers in the pilot 
to allow a robust assessment of the regular contact scheme.  This has had the 
advantage that it allows a review of both families who are used to the existing 
aggregation system and families who are new to childcare benefits. 
                                                 
8 Note that throughout this report “out of work” means those families where parents are either not in 
work or are working less than 16 hours a week and receiving childcare benefits via the New Deal run 
by Jobcentre Plus.  “In work” then means any family where the parents are working more than 16 hours 
a week. 
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Regions Targeted by the Pilots 
For all the cohorts, families for the pilot and control groups were selected from 
London and the South East.   
 
Given the activity and complexity of childcare arrangements within London, 
and the fact that many London Boroughs run their own subsidised holiday 
provision, (making the cost to families of holiday provision less than the 
national average), CAP09 was originally designed for areas outside the 
capital.  The Department for Education (DfE) had already been speaking to 
local authorities in the South East, as to whether they would be interested in 
participating in CAP09 pilots, and as childcare costs in the South East tend to 
be around average in the UK, it was sensible to run the Actual Costs pilot 
there. 
 
As recruitment into the pilot proved to be difficult, first the regional definition 
was widened to include London and then the earnings and employment 
definitions were relaxed.  In the event about 40% of families in the Actual 
Costs pilot were resident in London. 
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How were families allocated to pilot and control group? 
The sample was divided into pilot and control groups.  To ensure the pilot 
group was comparable with the control group, families were allocated at 
random according to postcode. The purpose of this allocation was to make 
sure that the pilot and control groups had the same pre-pilot characteristics, 
which is very important from the evaluation point of view.  Secondly, this 
reduced the possibility of families living next door to each other receiving 
different offers of support, if one was assigned to the pilot group and one to 
the control group, as this may have been perceived to be unfair. 
 
As families opted into the pilot schemes rather than being randomly allocated 
to them there was a potential problem of bias in our groups.  Pilot families 
must have a choice to join or not, and there is thus the possibility that families 
who choose to be paid on an actual costs basis could be fundamentally 
different from those who choose not to.  For example, families who do 
volunteer could be more likely to have costs which vary throughout the year, 
or they could be more engaged with the system (and would thus find the four-
weekly reporting less difficult).  Where possible then, data from other areas 
collected by HMRC has been used as comparators to spot any bias in results. 
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Processes for families in the pilot 
 
For the Actual Costs pilot, the method of reporting costs and of payment is 
quite different from the current system, and is outlined below: 
 
• Letters were sent to the pilot families outlining the payment of childcare 
costs on an ‘actual costs’ basis, with the availability of additional 
budgeting help via transition and / or advance payments.  Families in 
the control group were sent a letter outlining support under the current 
tax credits system; 
• Families not currently working 16 hours a week were advised this 
support would be available on their movement into work and childcare 
(Cohort 1a); 
• Families in work of more than 16 hours a week but not using registered 
childcare9 were advised of the availability of childcare entitlement if 
they used registered providers (Cohort 1b); 
• Families already in work and registered childcare were offered regular 
4 weekly contact and payment of actual childcare costs with the 
availability of additional budgeting help via a transition and / or advance 
payments (Cohort 2); 
• Families were invited to call a helpline run by a Department for 
Education (DfE) contractor10 if they wished to register an interest in the 
offer; 
• A random sample of families who did not call in received an outbound 
call from the contractor asking if they wish to register their interest; 
• Those families with whom the helpline did not make contact, received a 
reminder letter; 
• Those who registered an interest received Keep-In-Touch (KIT) calls 
after 2, 10 and 18 weeks to ask how their job or childcare search was 
progressing; 
• When families secured work and childcare, they were transferred to a 
dedicated team in HMRC Tax Credit Office, who managed their claim 
thereafter. 
 
Most of the initial calls were handled by the DfE contractor’s helpline rather 
than the normal HMRC tax credits helpline. After families secured work and 
childcare or if families had queries on tax credits, calls were transferred to a 
dedicated team in the HMRC Tax Credits Office (TCO). This was to help 
                                                 
9 Or, if they were using registered childcare, were not reporting this to HMRC 
10 The contractor provided professional contact centre support and was engaged by the DCSF (now 
DfE) to process interest in the pilots.  HMRC’s Tax Credit Office (TCO) ran the pilots once families 
engaged but did not have the resources for the initial engagement work. 
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reduce the impact on HMRC resource and operational components necessary 
to deliver the pilots. 
 
o Families could opt to receive a transition payment’ of up to £500 when 
they moved into work and childcare (cohort 1a), childcare (cohort 1b) 
or into the pilot’s payment in arrears system (cohort 2) with a view to 
covering their costs for the first four weeks (or sometimes for childcare 
deposit payments for Cohort 1 families);  
 
o They were required to call the dedicated team in the Tax Credit Office 
(TCO) at the end of every four weeks to report the costs they had 
incurred in that period. If the family failed to call, then the TCO team 
attempted to contact them by telephone and then by letter11. If they 
were unable to make contact, then the family did not receive any 
childcare support for that period; 
 
o Upon reporting their costs, families received 80% of these up to 
monthly limits set to broadly replicate the weekly limits under the 
current system. All of this support was paid separately from the rest of 
their tax credits award (by Giro cheque until April 2010 and by BACS 
thereafter);  
 
o When families called, they were asked if they expected their costs for 
the next four weeks to exceed the costs they had just reported by more 
than £100. If so, an advance facility was offered where they could draw 
forward some of their payment from the following period, up to a limit of 
£200. This was then deducted from the support they received in the 
next period; 
 
o After their final four weeks on the pilot, they did not receive a payment 
unless their costs for that period exceeded any transition payment that 
they received at the start of the pilot, in which case they received 80% 
of the difference (up to the relevant limits). 
 
                                                 
11 TCO staff all state that their experience was that customers rarely responded to Contact Centre 
impersonal reminders, better but not well to TCO letters and generally very well to TCO phone calls.  
This was particularly true early on in the pilots where families often had multiple questions and 
concerns about their benefits and the pilot that the experienced TCO operator was then able to deal 
with.  Certainly the telephone records in the TCO show lengthy calls early on related to payment 
queries (this category is predominantly about calls in relation to pilot payments especially calls to chase 
up families for their 4 week actual costs). 
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Management Information 
This section looks at the data held by HMRC in the TCO Pilot Office, on 
HMRC’s main Tax Credit systems, on the DfE contractor’s call centre 
database and at other data research undertaken by HMRC in this area.  This 
management information is analysed for pilot and control groups.  A number 
of key questions were set out for analysis at the start of the pilot and these 
precede each section in bold grey type. 
Number of families choosing the new system of payments 
 
“Cohort 1” 
A small number of families moved into work and childcare (cohort 1a), or took 
up childcare (cohort 1b). 
 
Figure 2 below shows that a large number of letters were sent to pilot and 
control group families.  These were followed up as planned by telephone 
contact and a number of families registered an interest in the pilot and either 
were looking to move into work and childcare or, if already in work, to take up 
formal childcare provision.  The contact and offer of 4 weekly contacts 
seemed to encourage some families to seek work and to enter employment 
and / or find childcare. 
 
Figure 2: Management information – actual costs pilots, cohort 1 
 Actual Costs (Cohort 1a: out of work)  
Actual Costs (Cohort 
1b: in work, no 
childcare) 
 
Pilot 
Group 
Control 
Group  
Pilot 
Group 
Control 
Group 
Mailed 13694 13695  18944 18915 
Inbound Calls 1080 702  1052 646 
Proportion 7.9% 5.0% 5.5% 3.4% 
Outbound Calls 4153 4008 4207 5034 
Proportion 30.3% 29.3% 22.2% 26.6% 
Registered an interest12  696 401 502 260 
Proportion 5.1% 2.9% 2.6% 1.4% 
Moved into work & 
childcare13  77 44 126 96 
Proportion14  0.6% 0.3% 0.7% 0.5% 
 
                                                 
12 ‘Registered an Interest’ are those families who when contacted by the DfE contractor both registered 
an interest in the pilot and declared that they were looking for work and / or registered childcare. 
13 Figures are based on families who have moved into work and childcare through the CAP09 process. 
14 The proportion of families who registered an interest and moved into work & childcare were 11% 
(pilot) and 11% (control) 
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Interestingly the proportions recruited under these parts of the Actual Costs 
pilots were similar to those achieved under a separate pilot offering to pay 
100% of childcare costs15.  
 
Movement into work 
Figure 3: Showing movement into work and childcare for each element of cohort 116 
Movement into work and childcare (Cohort 1a)
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In both cohorts the propensity for the pilot groups within CAP09 to find work 
and childcare or additional childcare is greater than for the control group 
suggesting that the availability of 4 weekly cost budgeting and the provision of 
transition payments encourages employment and take up of childcare.   
 
For Cohort 1a however, HMRC administrative data shows that almost twice 
as many families, who registered an interest in the pilot, moved into work and 
childcare before the end of the pilot period, but did so outside the CAP09 
process.  Hence they did not engage with the alternative ‘better budgeting’ 
process.  Clearly then cost budgeting may well be a factor in family decisions 
around work and childcare but other factors are also present and may in many 
cases supersede any perceived process advantages offered by the pilot17.  
The CAP09 research looks at this and provides valuable insights into the 
family decision process. 
 
In terms of the rate of movement into work in Cohort 1a there is a marked 
increase in the rate in September which probably relates to the end of the 
summer school holidays again indicating that work decisions include factors in 
addition to financial / budgeting issues.  The movement into childcare in 
Cohort 1b shows no such sudden rise which would seem to confirm this. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 It is interesting in terms of the 100% Pilot objectives in that it provides further evidence that 
affordability of childcare costs in and of themselves are not a single primary factor driving family 
decisions to move into work.  The response to the Actual Costs Pilot offer of 80% of actual costs 
resulted in as favourable a response to one where HMRC offered 100% of average costs. 
16 Data source – TCO records and HMRC administrative data from its tax credits system 
17 The decision to not enter the pilot may in some cases have been accidental, where aspects of the 
pilot’s design were either unclear or forgotten. 
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“Cohort 2” 
The third group, those already in work and childcare, and allowing families in 
with higher incomes, generated considerable interest in joining the pilot18.  
Whether this is because those already claiming childcare benefits more 
immediately understood an attraction in claiming actual costs or whether there 
was something in the delivery system that skewed the response is not known.  
However following the initial registering of interest when speaking to the DfE 
contractor a large proportion19 then dropped out when contacted by the TCO 
to initiate the pilot saying they were no longer interested.  The suspicion is 
that only on speaking to the TCO did families understand the pilot offer and 
that on hearing there were no enhanced benefits they dropped out.  
Nonetheless some 868 families did agree to join the pilot. 
 
                                                 
18 From about 30,000 families mailed with the offer there were over 5000 families registering an 
interest in the pilot. 
19 Of the 5000 families who registered an interest in the pilot with the DfE contractor, The TCO and the 
DfE contractor then contacted them to join the pilot.  On contact however only 868 agreed to join.  As 
is seen below in the section on reasons for non take up the main reason given for changing their mind 
were not wanting 4 weekly contact with HMRC 
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Number of families who drop out of the pilot system, particularly 
those who return to the standard system 
Analysis of the pilot data suggests that there is no significant difference 
between the cohorts as to why pilot families left the pilots.  In three quarters of 
cases they simply completed the course. 
 
Figure 4: Reasons why families left the Actual Costs pilots 
Ceased reason  Number of cases 
Compliance case 2 
Do not want cash cheque 1 
Do not want contact monthly 1% 9 
End Of Pilot Period 73% 786 
Income increased over limit 2% 21 
Miscellaneous 16% 173 
Want to leave Pilot 7% 79 
 
It is not known whether families understood they could leave the pilot part way 
through however a few (7%) certainly did. 
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Does the pilot system help parents cope better with seasonal 
variations in childcare costs? 
Season variations and the extent to which these are close to 
monthly limits for claiming childcare costs 
The periods covered by the pilots were unfortunately too short to study 
seasonal changes with not even a complete year of data. 
 
Figure 5: Variation in 4 weekly cost of childcare over the period Sep 2009 to Oct 2010 
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Figure 6: Monthly variation in average childcare costs series (source: HMRC administrative 
data) 
Change in average childcare costs
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These results confirm the existence of a seasonal rise in August and 
September20. 
 
An oddity in this finding is that the analysis is looking at HMRC administrative 
data which is tracking families’ stated annual average costs across each year.  
As such there should not be any seasonality as the averaging is designed to 
smooth out fluctuations in payment.  Clearly then there is an issue in the 
averaging system whereby either families are unable to average their costs or 
are unable to predict fluctuations in costs in advance21.  This aspect will be 
looked at in more detail later on in the section on error and fraud and 
overpayments. 
 
A review of 4 weekly claims, in addition to highlighting the higher costs in 
August and September, shows a significant variation in amounts across the 
cohorts. 
 
Figure 7: Variation in 4 weekly cost of childcare over the period September 2009 to October 
2010 for each Cohort. 
Cohort 1a Cohort 1b Cohort 2  Cohort 1a (out of 
work at start of 
pilot) Average 4 weekly claim 
No. of  
claims 
Average 4 
weekly claim
No. of  
claims 
Average 4 
weekly claim 
No. of  
claims 
  June Not available22  5         
2009 July Not available 0         
  August Not available 1         
  September £554 11         
  October £420 29         
  November £364 51 Not available 5     
  December £401 47 £186 20     
                
  January £307 45 £183 26     
2010 February £358 49 £226 55     
  March £363 61 £214 113     
  April £386 59 £249 108     
  May £334 51 £236 97 Not available 4 
  June £351 56 £290 103 £469 488 
  July £371 48 £294 93 £541 742 
  August £452 38 £342 79 £618 648 
  September £545 20 £472 38 £657 631 
  October         £595 7 
Note: claims are 4 weekly so it has not been possible to 100% accurately align a claim with a 
specific month’s costs however the table provides a robust guide of costs over the pilot 
period. 
                                                 
20 September may be higher perhaps as families realise their higher summer holiday costs and claim 
after the event for their costs.  In 2005/06 there were some policy changes – the limits were increased 
in April 05 and the % of eligible costs paid in April 06 (70% to 80%), which caused a change in the 
normal seasonal variations in costs. 
21 There is a further complication in the current system in that families can apply for support for fixed 
periods only, which if short enough is closer to an actual costs system 
22 Averages are not taken where there are 5 or less items within a sample as results have a tendency to 
be skewed. 
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There are a number of possible explanations as to why reported childcare 
costs varied across the three cohorts: 
o Firstly it is noted that the expected summer peak in September has 
materialised as predicted; 
o Families in Cohort 1a are new to work and come from a lower income 
bracket than Cohort 2.  As such lower childcare costs may relate to 
lower skill or experience levels23 and being new to a job and earning 
lower salaries. 
o Families in Cohort 1b were in the same income bracket as Cohort 1a 
so may share the same skill levels and job expectations.  In addition as 
they were already in work but not claiming childcare they may already 
have a better informal network of childcare support thus reducing their 
financial requirement for formal childcare arrangements. 
o Families in Cohort 2 are from a higher income bracket and therefore 
may be in a more skilled group.  They are already established in work 
and therefore may be in more sustainable employment with better 
prospects leading to more confidence in payment for the provision of 
childcare costs. 
 
This next set of tables looks at cases based on seasonality, the number of 
children, and family set up, where eligible weekly childcare limits are 
breached (i.e. where costs reported in that period would exceed £175 for one 
child or £300 for two or more children).  Data is for Cohort 2 only where 
families generally have higher awards. 
 
Figure 8: Monthly pattern showing where 4 weekly cost of childcare exceeds the maximum 
sums available under the benefit over the period May 2010 to October 2010 for cohort 2 
(families in work and childcare at the start of the pilot) 
Month 
% of Claims 
Exceeding 
Weekly) 
Limit 
% of 
Claims 
Within 
weekly 
limit 
Total no. 
of 
payments 
May 4 
June 22% 78% 488 
July 27% 73% 742 
August 33% 67% 648 
September 38% 62% 361 
October 14% 86% 7 
 
                                                 
23 Where someone is new to work and possibly in lower skilled work, income is likely to be lower.  
This might affect childcare decisions where price differentials exist in the market or affect the number 
of hours of formal childcare that a family can afford. 
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Figure 9: table showing the propensity for breaching available maximum benefits depending 
on the number of children in a family.  Period May 2010 to October 2010 for cohort 2 (families 
in work and childcare at the start of the pilot) 
No of children 
% of Claims 
Exceeding 
Weekly) 
Limit 
% of 
Claims 
Within 
weekly 
limit 
Total no. 
of 
payments 
1 35% 65% 1011 
2 24% 76% 792 
3 22% 78% 295 
4 32% 68% 120 
5 44% 56% 25 
6 14% 86% 7 
 
Figure 10: table showing the propensity for breaching available maximum benefits depending 
on the family set up at the start of the pilot.  Period May 2010 to October 2010 for cohort 2 
(families in work and childcare at the start of the pilot) 
Family status at 
start of pilot 
% of Claims 
Exceeding 
Weekly) 
Limit 
% of 
Claims 
Within 
weekly 
limit 
Total no. 
of 
payments 
Couple in work 25% 75% 550 
Single in work 31% 69% 1700 
 
HMRC estimate from administrative data that on average across the country 
around 5% to 6% of stated average childcare costs exceed the current limits 
and clearly the percentages here are much higher.  Reasons for this include: 
o 40% of pilot families are London based families in the sample where 
administrative data shows that costs tend, on average, to be 40% 
higher than elsewhere. 
o The pilot is covering the peak summer period on an actual cost rather 
than an annual average basis so it is expected that a higher 
percentage of claims will exceed the current limits. 
o There is a disproportionate number of single parent families in the pilot 
in line with London families generally.  The data indicates that childcare 
costs for this group are higher. 
 
Nonetheless it can be stated from this data: 
o Budgeting for seasonal peaks is an issue for families. 
o That there is no clear trend suggesting that the financial childcare 
maximum for families with one child is breached any less than for those 
with more than one child. 
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o That single parent families do need higher levels of childcare support 
than couples possibly because partners in couples can to some extent 
share childcare duties between them whilst the other parent works, a 
degree of flexibility which is not available to a lone parent. 
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Number of families using transition payment and advance facilities 
and extent of this 
Research at the Department for Education24 (DfE) showed that across the 
country 52% of Full Day Care providers charged a deposit fee (average 
charge £88) whereas sessional or other groups charged deposits less often 
(circa 20% of providers with average deposits around £30 to £40).  The DfE 
report does not look at whether there are regional splits for deposits so 
whether deposits are more prevalent and higher in London and the South 
East is not known.  The Actual Costs pilot works on a payment in arrears 
process so an ‘transition’ payment was offered to all pilot families to help them 
budget, either with payment of deposit fees, or with the move from advance to 
arrears payments.  Depending on the size of the transition payment and the 
monthly childcare claim, the transition payment was offset against the credit 
payable in the last month of the pilot, with any excess being offset against 
future childcare payments or becoming repayable as a debt. 
 
As families joined the Actual Cost Pilot about half of the pilot participants 
elected to receive an transition payment to help them budget. 
Figure 11: Proportion of Actual Costs pilot families who elected to receive an transition 
payment to cover the first month. 
Pilot type 
Transition 
payment made 
Transition 
payment not 
made 
Total number 
of families 
Cohort 1a: Actual Costs, out of 
work 52% 48% 77 
Cohort 1b: Actual Costs, in work, 
no childcare 43% 57% 126 
Cohort 2: Actual Costs, in work 
and childcare 51% 49% 868 
Overall 50% 50%  
 
In the case of Cohort 2 this was designed to help cover the move to payments 
in arrears for monthly fees.  Pilot records show that very few then had any 
difficulty repaying the transition sums paid suggesting a better awareness of 
budgeting or an awareness of the nature of an interest free loan rather than a 
need for additional money.  For Cohort 1a and 1b there may be some element 
of financial need to cover deposits but as the Department of Education 
research shows the sums charged are generally only a small fraction of the 
maximum transition payment offered (£500). 
 
Cohort 1b does however have a significantly lower take up rate for the 
transition payment than the other groups but this may align with the lower 
average childcare costs claimed and a further reduced need for any budgeting 
support. 
 
                                                 
24 Childcare and Early Years providers 2008 research carried out by the British Market Research 
Bureau 
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Where transition payments were made these were not always for the full £500 
available. 
 
Figure 12: charts showing the proportion of families overall and in each cohort who utilised 
the transition payment facility and of these how many used the full limit available. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall extent of use of initial payments
194
343
534
Full transition payment
Less than full transition payment
No payment
Extent of use of initial payments, Cohort 1a (out of 
work at start of pilot)
24
16
37
Full transition payment
Less than full transition payment
No payment
Extent of use of initial payments, Cohort 1b (in 
work, no childcare at start of pilot)
8
46
72
Full transition payment
Less than full transition payment
No payment
Extent of use of initial payments, Cohort 2 (in 
work and childcare at start of pilot)
162
281
425
Full transition payment
Less than full transition payment
No payment
 
Factors in terms of family size, set up etc. that might influence the taking of a 
transition payment have been examined.  Data indicates that lone parents are 
more likely to ask for a transition payment than couples and that income 
levels where transition payments are requested are higher in London than the 
South East.  It has not been possible to further stratify the data due to small 
sample sizes. 
 
In addition to the transition payment facility the CAP09 pilot also offered an 
‘advance payment’ facility to help families cope with sudden unexpected 
costs.  In the event there were only 9 requests for an advance payment 
throughout the CAP09 pilot.  The facility was not something raised by the 
TCO on a regular basis during 4 weekly calls but was raised in the initial 
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contact by the DfE contractor suggesting either a lack of need for such 
additional support or a lack of awareness of the facility.   
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Extent to which the pilot system reduces error and overpayments 
The TCO have collated a list of cases where it is believed there is a significant 
risk of error or fraud, and have passed these cases to HMRC’s compliance 
teams to review.  To date only a proportion of investigations have been 
completed25 so the following analysis concentrates on the ‘at risk’ rather than 
‘proven risk’ position. 
 
Figure 13 – table showing the level of non compliance in the Actual Cost pilot groups.  Non 
compliance may be related to childcare or any other matter linked to a claim 
Actual Cost Pilot cases referred to Compliance 
Pilot Type Number of Referrals 
Number of 
families in 
the pilot 
% 
Queried 
Not in work or childcare at start of pilot (cohort 1a) 2 77 3% 
In work but not childcare at start of pilot (cohort 1b) 3 126 2% 
In work and childcare at start of pilot (cohort 2) 75 868 9% 
In addition there were 10 cases referred from the ‘100% pilot’ (7% of pilot total) 
 
The latest current estimate of error and fraud rates amongst tax credit 
customers is 8.9%26.  Existing childcare claims have an even higher rate of 
error and fraud at around 25%.  With additional support in pilot families’ claims 
from the TCO it would be expected that even existing claimants would have a 
lower rate of error and fraud27.  This equates to the level of referrals picked up 
in cohort 2 where pilot participants are already tax credit customers28.  The 
greater scrutiny through more regular contact with the same group of trained 
TCO staff has ‘simply’ uncovered the expected level of error / fraud in the 
group29. 
 
Of more significance perhaps is the extremely low rate of error and fraud 
found in cohorts 1a and 1b.  In both cases families are new to childcare 
benefits so in both cases they will have been guided through eligibility and 
calculation matters by the TCO staff.  Based on this study then it is possible to 
say that referral rates, and therefore probably error and fraud rates, in 
                                                 
25 Of the 90 cases identified to date, 72 have been assessed by compliance teams with a potential loss 
prevention value of over £675,000.  Of these, cases valuing £64,000 have been completed.  Causes of 
error / fraud are primarily related to childcare costs, but not all are related to childcare as undeclared 
partners, income issues, and working hours have been uncovered.  “Losses prevented” is the equivalent 
value to the Exchequer of revenue lost as a result of error or fraud. 
26 Child and Working Tax Credits, Error and Fraud Statistics 2008/09 
27 Compliance checks covered the existing claim as well as the claim under the CAP09 pilot so some 
error and fraud was expected. 
28 There is no evidence for or against the idea that as a voluntary scheme participants are biased either 
towards excluding those who would prefer to avoid regular contact because they know they may have 
elements of error or fraud in their claim or to those who know they make mistakes and would like more 
help. 
29 There is not a standard comparison with cases referred to compliance for investigation and published 
error and fraud statistics, however the reduction in referral rate is significant. 
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childcare benefits have reduced by about 7% as a result of working the Actual 
Cost pilot mechanism30. 
 
There has generally been a low rate of overpayment generated by the pilot31.  
However 7 out of the 9 ‘advance’ payment cases resulted in an overpayment.  
Of the other 119 Actual Cost families who had an overpayment 27 arose from 
the family deciding to leave the pilot after the transition payment was made. 
All 27 cases were in Cohort 2 (where the customer was already in work and 
childcare, none in cohorts 1a or 1b32.  The remaining cases were for standard 
reasons of changes in circumstances and hardship.   
 
The national picture of overpayments33 shows that in 2008/09 some 6.9 
million tax credit awards were made of which 1.3 million resulted in 
overpayments (19%).  This includes all award payments for Working Tax 
Credit and Child Tax Credit.  Given that the error and fraud rate for childcare 
payments at 25% has traditionally been much higher than other awards, it is 
reasonable to assume the percentage of overpayments for childcare may also 
be greater. 
 
The overpayment cases in the Actual Costs pilot varied slightly between the 
three cohorts: 
o Not in work or childcare (cohort 1a) – 11 out of 77 cases had an 
overpayment (14%) though three of these related to families who took 
the transition payment then left the pilot (net 8 out of 74 = 11%) 
o In work but not in childcare (cohort 1b) – 13 out of 126 cases had an 
overpayment (10%) but seven of these cases related to taking the 
transition payment and leaving the pilot or failing to call in their costs 
(net 6 out of 119 = 5%) 
o In work and childcare – 104 out of 868 cases had an overpayment 
(12%) but of these 23 took the transition payment and left the pilot and 
11 simply stopped calling in their costs (net 70 out of 834 = 8%) 
There is no available analysis to confirm the exact link between error and 
fraud and overpayments.  It is known that the main cause of overpayments 
across all tax credits is the under estimating of income and late notification of 
changes in circumstances.  However with a high rate of error in the childcare 
element there may be an associated high rate of overpayment.  There is a 
further caveat in that overpayment statistics relate to post finalisation cases so 
covering the full year whereas the CAP09 pilot ran only over a few months 
allowing for less time for income or other adjustments to happen.  As an 
                                                 
30 The higher rate of error / fraud of 7% in the 100% pilot further supports this thesis as 100% pilot 
families did not have the advantage of monthly contacts or as much help with their calculations at 
outset. 
31 There were 128 overpayment cases in the Actual Costs pilot representing 12% of all families in the 
pilot. 
32 This may be more to do with existing childcare families deciding they didn’t want a 4 weekly contact 
or perhaps those who took advantage of an opportunity for perceived financial gain. 
33 Child and Working Tax Credit Statistics – Finalised Annual Awards 2008/09 – Supplement on 
payments in 2008/09 
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actual costs process however TCO staff did question families wherever 
income and childcare details suggested possible non compliance. 
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Reasons for non take up 
It has not been possible to ascertain why families chose not to take up the 
pilot offer from administrative data and the data provided to HMRC by the DfE 
contractor34. 
 
There is however some data on 808 Actual Costs cases held in TCO, for 
families who for some reason contacted them direct rather than going to the 
DfE contractor. 
 
Figure 14 – table showing the reasons recorded as to why families chose not to participate in 
the Actual Costs pilot 
Pilot Type 
Change 
of Circs 
made 
ineligible 
Work / 
childcare 
preceded 
letter 
Do not 
want to 
cash 
cheque 
Do not 
want 
monthly 
contact 
T&C not 
accepted 
Actual (no work no 
Childcare) 5 7 4 3 0 
Actual (in work no 
Childcare) 2 20 1 8 0 
Actual (in work in 
Childcare) 107 1 0 438 212 
TOTAL 114 28 5 449 212 
 
This shows then that by and large, where the family was eligible, that most 
potential participants who dropped out did so because they saw no advantage 
for themselves in regular 4-weekly contact to help budget their costs or that 
they thought regular 4 weekly contacts were too onerous. 
 
                                                 
34 Please refer to section 8.3 of “Qualitative research into families’ experiences and behaviours in the 
Childcare Affordability Pilots (CAP09): Actual Costs Pilot - A research report for the HMRC” for the 
report on the research findings about reasons for non take up for this CAP09 pilot. 
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Cost / benefit analysis – implications for implementing an actual 
costs system for child care costs 
A full cost benefit analysis has been completed with the help of the HMRC 
TCO team.  A full set of process maps have been drawn up and set out in 
Appendix 01 and timings and costs estimated for each stage in Appendix 02.  
Against these costs, benefits have been estimated in terms of a reduction in 
referrals / error & fraud in the tax credit system, as a result of more active and 
regular call handling.  All figures in the cost benefit analysis are based on the 
findings from the CAP09 Actual Cost pilot. 
 
Figure 15 – Cost / Benefit Analysis summary – for full analysis please see Appendix 02 
CBA Value (£) 
Total Costs in pilot (3 months) £67,748 
Total costs if run within standard TCO 
systems (3 months) £61,764 
Additional ‘compliance check’ costs (3 
months) £22,392 
Annualised Cost £336,624 
  
Total benefits Between £320,000 and £420,000 
 
The benefits figure is given as a range because the average yield35 figures in 
the TCO compliance report look high compared to average yields for childcare 
tax credit cases.  This may partly be down to counting of past year yield gains 
into the calculation or potential late recording of changes36.  The average 
yield figure in the TCO record is £6,782 however this has been reduced by 
40% to 60% to account for any possible over estimation.  Arguably the 
average yield figure could be reduced still further but as these are mainly 
London cases where awards and yield tends to be higher than elsewhere in 
the country this has not been done. 
                                                
 
This analysis works for the CAP09 pilot but not necessarily if translated to 
become ‘business as usual’.  CAP09 was staffed appropriately37 so allowed 
families excellent access into phone services therefore a revised cost benefit 
analysis is needed to assess the efficacy of the Actual Cost process for all tax 
credit childcare customers.  There may be practical difficulties because of the 
number of families who preferred not to commit to 4 weekly contact with the 
TCO38.  However the pilot was voluntary and perhaps a mandated system 
 
35 Yield is the financial value of the reduction in error and fraud. 
36 The family may have reported the change later on in the year anyway, so reducing any financial 
implications of an overpayment. 
37 Staff numbers were sufficient to answer 100% of calls and staff were trained tax credit administrators 
so able to provide a wide range of help and advice. 
38 A concern is that the pilot groups might be ‘biased’ as those who reject regular contact may have 
characteristics more prone to error or delay. 
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would have fewer issues39 especially if payments stopped if families failed to 
call 4 weekly to renew their claim40.   If it were possible to identify higher risk 
families and pull only them into a telephone based actual cost system this 
might reduce the numbers and increase the benefits though a method for 
other (lower risk) families will be needed for them to record their actual 
childcare costs too. 
 
Under the current tax credit process all families renew their claims over a 
short period at the start of the financial year.  Applying an actual cost system 
for all families on the basis run in CAP09 then may put a burden on call 
operatives at this time of peak activity during the year, which could lead to 
unanswered calls and lower service standards. 
 
                                                 
39 People generally dislike change so presumably will settle into a ‘norm’ in time if it is mandated.  It 
could however be equally strongly argued that participants of the pilot were volunteers and therefore 
may more naturally accept change, so a mandated system would raise additional issues. 
40 Stopped payments can create other problems however as families realise their mistake and then try to 
reinstate benefits however recent policy changes to limit back dating to a single month minimise this 
cost. 
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Operational Considerations 
In bringing into operation an actual costs system a number of factors arise 
that need consideration if this is to be practical and cost effective.  Families 
will need access to a dedicated team of staff throughout the year who 
understand their needs and who have time to follow standard compliance 
processes during calls. 
 
Call statistics from CAP09 were as follows41: 
Figure 16 – table showing call times for CAP09 Actual Cost pilot families over the period 
between April and July 2010 
April to July 2010 Average call 
length (mins) 
Average wrap 
up time42 
(mins) 
Number of 
calls 
Not in work or childcare 9.55 6.34 573 
In work, not childcare 9.46 6.31 966 
In work & childcare 10.44 3.78 4082 
 
There is no equivalent control data for families not in the pilot43. 
The data shows minimal variation in call length whether the family is new to 
childcare or not but extended wrap up time for families new to childcare.  TCO 
telephone data shows that call times and wrap up times reduced over the pilot 
as families settled into the CAP09 process, and as any system changes 
needed to be completed by TCO staff were completed44. 
A number of TCO calls related to chase up calls to families who failed to call 
up with their actual childcare costs on time.  Telephone statistics show 
however that especially in the group who previously claimed childcare costs 
that they increasingly got used to the revised process but there was a major 
overhead early on in chasing families. 
Figure 17 – proportion of families who called the TCO on time with their 4 weekly childcare 
costs 
  Actual Cost Pilot 
Reported 4 weekly 
costs on time Out of work 
In work, no 
CC In work & CC 
April 88% 78% #N/A 
May 61% 53% 16% 
June 67% 72% 58% 
July 82% 82% 92% 
Note: out of work and childcare and in work, not childcare groups started their pilots a few 
months earlier but telephone records are available only from April 2010.  They had already 
had their settling in period as it were by April 2010. 
                                                 
41 There are no data covering unanswered calls or call waiting time 
42 Wrap up time is additional time the call operator needs to finalise any notes of system changes after 
they have completed the call. 
43 HMRC administrative data for average call handling times for renewals shows an average length of 8 
minutes per call (this excludes wrap up time).  It is likely that childcare specific calls take longer due to 
the complexity of the award. 
44 System changes were required to ensure payments were aligned with the main Tax credits system 
and any transactional data required for the main tax credits system after CAP09 finished were in place. 
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To roll the actual costs system out to all childcare families would require a 
significant increase in trained call handlers.  This could be mitigated if families 
could utilise self serve options at least for their monthly cost updates.  
However there is the potential of increased error and fraud from self serve 
channels.  Much of the improvement achieved in CAP09 is believed to be 
linked to both having personal contact with trained staff and having regular 
contact with the same staff.  It is possible that methodologies for risk 
categorisation of families might be found allowing a light touch approach for 
‘lower risks’, thus reducing overall operational costs, whilst minimising any 
loss of improvement in error and fraud. 
 
APPENDIX 01 – CAP09 process flow charts 
DCSF Eligibility checks for Pilot only, not BAU
N N
Y Y
Auto in BAU
1. Eligibility checks
N
3. Initial payment required?
4. Calculate initial payment
Y
Y
Y
N
5. Update system (bank details etc.)
6. Explain follow up process
Y N 2. Input CC data into system
Y Y
N N
11. Advance required? 9. Update system
10. prepare payment
Y Y Y
Go to
Flow
Chart 2
7. Check payment due 8. Ascertain CC costs N N Auto in BAU
N 12. calc advance due; deduct earlier advance
N
13. Calc run on incl any initial / advance; update system
Y
DCSF check eligibility, register 
interest, allocate weekly slots, notify 
TCO re change of contact numbers.  
Any other changes to be passed to 
HMRC Contact Centre
DCSF to send shortened 
version of T&Cs to 
customers registering 
interest and notify TCO
Just before individual weekly slot, 
DCSF to communicate - SMS / e-
mail / ltr with customers to inform of 
pending TCO contact
TCO to do outbound 
calls averaged of 
week
Adviser 
authenticate 
customer
Check eligibility - 
refresh customer of 
pilot details
Is customer 
eligible?
Does 
customer want 
to join pilot?
Adviser to allocate start date, 
cease, childcare on NTC, 
enter MC marker and 
household retained.  Note 1.  
Finalise PY if possible
Customer 
incurring 
childcare 
costs now or 
t t i
Ascertain start date 
of childcare
Adviser to capture 
childcare provider 
and start date on 
database
Is customer 4 
weekly paid?
Customer 
wants weekly 
CC 
payments?
Update database to 
show 4 weekly
Update database 
to show weekly
Does 
customer want 
Initial 
payment?
Obtain 4 weekly cost & calculate 
80% for initial payment - up to 
max of £500 - update database
Ascertain bank 
details - database 
updated
Explain follow up 
process.  Enter BF date 
on database where CC 
due to start after 4 
weeks
Adviser to issue 
bespoke letter and 
T&Cs
Database updated daily to 
release payments
Inbound call 
for CC 
payments?
Is this the first 
notification of 
CC in pilot?
Is payment 
due now?
Follow appropriate flow 
chart
Request customer to call 
back / put on BF - end call
Adviser to check childcare 
details and ascertain what 
childcare costs were paid 
previous period & what is likely 
to pay next period
Is customer 
eligible for 
advance?
Explan 
process.  
Does 
customer want 
d ?
Adviser to calculate total advance 
due deducting any earlier advance
Adviser to calculate total CC 
payment due
Adviser to update 
database and advise 
customer to call again
Adviser prepares and 
issues bespoke letter 
explaining the 
calculation and childcare 
cost
Database updated daily to 
release payments
Childcare only 
has ceased?
Adviser to cease 
Pilot from CC end 
date
Adviser to calculate 4 
weekly childcare run-on 
taking into account of +/- 
advance / initial payment
Adviser to update Tax Credit retained 
notes & database
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14. Benefit end
13. No call from customer re benefits 7. Payment enquiry
15. Change of circumstances 14. Benefit end
16. Pilot / Control: rejoining
17. Complaints received
Auto in BAU
Y
N
Auto in BAU
Y
Y Y
N N
Auto in BAU
Y N
N Y
Pass to Complaints Team as BAU
Adviser to update database with 
pilot end date, issue bespoke 
letter & notify DCSF
Manager to do daily update of 
database which will issue all 
payments due
Adviser issues bespoke letter
Update database & issue 
bespoke letter
Adviser to put MC marker 
on system and update 
retained note
B/f has expired and no 
customer contact
Adviser to calculate 4 
weeks childcare run-on 
taking account of any 
advance / initial payment
Adviser to deal with or 
escalate
Update database / NTC 
and issue bespoke letter
Adviser to update 
database and NTC 
system and explain follow 
up process.  End call
Call received at DCSF & channelled 
to appropriate area (see Flow Chart 
1)
Customer wants to cease 
pilot
No customer contact by b/f 
date
Employment has ceased / 
reduced hours to less than 
16
Customer wants to 
rejoin pilot?
Complaints received
Refer to NTC CC
Adviser finds out reason 
and updates database
Adviser explains 
consequences
Adviser calculates and 
childcare payment due
Wxpired b/f list sent to 
DCSF to issue reminders.  
Further b/f date recorded on 
database
Adviser to issue bespoke 
reminder letter.  B/f on 
database
Adviser to cease 
childcare element on 
database
Pass to project leader
Is it relating to pilot
Send Entitlement Ended 
stencil to appropriate 
team
Adviser to inform 
customer of remaining 
duration of pilot
Customer calls with 
CC amount before 
b/f date
Refresh customer pilot 
details
Is complaint about 
TCO
WTC entitlement 
ended?
Pass to DCSF
Update database and end call
Is customer eligible 
to go back on pilot?
Update NTC system
APPENDIX 02 – Cost Benefit Analysis 
COSTS
Step on flow 
chart
(New) Customer incurrs 
childcare costs now or in 
next 4 weeks Volume (Hit) rate
Process 
time [mins] Cost
1 Eligibility checks 1212 10 £3,316
Compliance check 9% 15 £5,968.88
2
Input childcare data onto 
system
1103
20 £6,035.20
3 Initial payment required? 487 50% 10 £1,333.27
4 Calculate initial payment 487 20 £2,666.54
5
Update system (bank details 
etc.)
487
10 £1,333.27
6 Explain follow up process 487 5 £666.64
Automatic on 
TCO system
System releases payment 1103
5 £1,508.80
Automatic on 
TCO system
Letter confirming T&Cs and 
details
1103
5 £1,508.80
Additional calls / work
Award 5 13 £17.78
17 Complaints/Compliments 18 27 £159.56
15 Overpayments 4 6 £6.57
Security 1 4 £1.19
Inbound call for payment of childcare benefit
7 Check payment due 2182 90% 3 £1,790.99
8
Ascertain childcare cost 
details 10 £5,969.97
928 2% 15 £4,568.98
9 Update system 2138 5 £2,925.29
10 Prepare pa
Compliance check
yment £0.00
11 Advance required? 11 1% 10 £29.25
12
Calculate advance due, 
deduct earlier advance 20 £58.51
Automatic on 
TCO system
System releases payment 1084
5 £1,483.42
Automatic on 
TCO system
Letter confirming T&Cs and 
details
1084
5 £1,483.42
13 If no call received 412
Contact centre call out 5 £187.87
TCO letter, reminding them to call 5 £187.87
TCO phone call 5 £187.87
Additional calls (non pilot customers etc.) (Existing customer) Change of circumstances - Inbo
15 Change of Circumstances 11 10 £30.10
15 General Enquiry 2388 12 £7,840.31
16 Pilot/Control 309 19 £1,606.31
15 Renewals 3 5 £4.10
2407 2% 15 £11,854.04
Benefits end
14
Calculate run on (incl any 
initial or advance payment; 
update s
Compliance check
 ystem 1103 10 £3,017.60
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TOTAL COSTS
TOTAL COST £67,748
TOTAL COST WITH EXISTING BAU AUTOMATION £61,764
Compliance cost £22,392
It's likely additional E&F will be found at CoC and Payment but this analysis
assumes the pre-award checks will cover most E&F
Grossed up for the year incl compliance (BAU): £336,624
BENEFITS
No. of cases Hit rate
Non 
compliant 
cases
Average 
yield Total yield
Pre-award 1212 7% 85 £3,750 £318,150
CoC / enquiry 2399 0 £0
Payment 928 0 £0
£318,150
FTE test
Actual average FTE 12.45
Estimated cost £336,624
divided by average salary £27,185
Estimated FTE 12.38  
 
 
 
Costs are derived from assumptions as to the average costs per member of staff, the 
volume of items processed and the time taken to complete an item.  Staff costs have 
allowed for absences and other standard periods of ‘down time’ for training etc. 
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